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Respondent Self-Focus and the Internal Consistency
of the Motivational Style Profile
Kenneth M. Cramer, Kathryn D. Lafreniere, and Phillip A. Ianni
University of Windsor
One of the underlying tenets of both personality and social psychological theory assumes that
questionnaire respondents have access to their thoughts and feelings. The same tenet underlies the various reversal theory states (e.g., telic/paratelic, negativism/conformity, autic mastery/sympathy, alloic mastery/sympathy), so that individuals who are more internally focused
should have better access to their internal states and have higher internal consistency ratings
across all measures. To evaluate this tenet, 620 participants recruited from a community sample completed a questionnaire that included the Motivational Style Profile and three self-focus
measures: self-monitoring, identity formation, and private self-consciousness. Participants
were divided (by median split) into low and high self-focus categories for each measure. Results showed that highly self-focused individuals had significantly higher internal consistency
estimates. Implications for the psychometric properties of the MSP are discussed, as are directions for future research.
Keywords: reversal theory, self-focus, reliability, psychometrics

Along with validity, reliability is one of the key underlying principles in measurement theory. Self-report inventories typically used by social science researchers (in various fields, including personality, motivation, and social psychology) are assumed to be reliable (Streiner, Norman, &
Cairney, 2014). Scales that have low internal consistency are
problematic because they indicate the constituent items differ
substantially from one another so as to suggest they do not
measure the same unitary construct (Miller, Lovler, & McIntire, 2013). Furthermore, low test reliability can reduce the
magnitude of correlations and diminish their statistical significance (Siegrist, 1996; Streiner et al., 2014). Additionally,
it is reasonable to speculate that internal consistency could be
affected by individual difference (personality) variables, particularly those that render a person more in touch with his/her
thoughts and feelings (hereafter referred to as “self-focus”).
That is, the internal consistency (reliability) of a scale may
be greater or enhanced for participants who are more selfreflective and introspective. To use an example, when research participants are asked to reflect on their psychological

state, attitude, or opinion (on for instance the death penalty),
those with greater self-focus will be capable of reflecting
thoughtfully on the question, and render more accurate and
reliable data; less pensive or self-focused individuals are less
inclined toward self-exploration of their thoughts and feelings; by this, their responses are rendered more variable, and
less reliable. Establishing a link between self-focus and a
scale’s internal consistency should invite researchers to select participants who possess this inward accessibility, so that
scientific hypothesis testing is more precise.
Reversal theory offers a unique arena for an evaluation of this hypothesis.
Reversal theory (Apter,
2001) is a meta-motivational framework that posits people alternate between opposing pairs of metamotivational
states (e.g., telic/paratelic, arousal avoidance/seeking, negativism/conformity, autic mastery/sympathy, alloic mastery/sympathy); each can be assessed using the Motivational
Style Profile (MSP; Apter, Mallows, & Williams, 1998).
Whereas the retest reliabilities among the MSP scales are
expected to be low (due to the transitory nature of reversal
states over short and especially over long periods of time),
the MSP subscales need still be internally consistent to offer researchers confidence in their reliable and valid measurement (Cramer, 2013). Most MSP subscales demonstrate
good internal consistency (alphas > .70), but some in particular, such as conformity and autic mastery subscales, exhibit
unacceptably lower reliability (Lafreniere & Cramer, 2006).
The unreliability of these subscales casts doubt on their associations with other constructs, and may produce spurious
empirical results in the form of false positive or negative out-
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comes (Type I and Type II errors respectively), and one could
never know which (Field, 2014; Howell, 2012).
There are various means by which researchers can augment a scale’s internal consistency (Miller et al., 2013).
Whereas one may opt to develop a set of new items, this
method can prove time consuming and in some cases even
fruitless. A second option involves identifying what may be
the systematic source for the unreliability, namely that the
systematic error variance of an instrument is tied to a relevant internal disposition (personality trait). If we use this
trait to identify and exclude participants for whom the scale
has low reliability, we may find that the reliability of these
scales has been rendered artifactually low. This raises the
question: which traits can be used for this purpose?
One likely candidate is a family of traits known as selffocus (alternatively known as “self-awareness”). It is believed that individuals who are more self-focused have higher
internal consistency ratings because they have better access
to their internal states (Cramer, 2000; Hergenhahn, Olson, &
Cramer, 2015). Answering items on a questionnaire that tries
to measure a given attitude, opinion, attribution, state, or trait
promotes an introspective quest for the answer, causing individuals to direct their attention inwardly, toward themselves
(Siegrist, 1996). Research shows that self-focused attention increases awareness of internal states (Scheier & Carver,
1977). Situations too can promote self-awareness and reduce
the likelihood of minor transgressions. Beaman, Klentz, Diener, and Svanum (1979) demonstrated that by placing a mirror behind an unguarded candy bowl, Halloween trick-ortreaters were more likely to observe the stipulated instruction to select only one candy. Finally, greater self-awareness
allows individuals to focus on aspects of themselves that are
relevant to the construct assessed by the questionnaire. This
greater self-awareness enables individuals who are more selffocused to be able to respond to questionnaires in a more
consistent manner.
There are three key conceptions of self-focus in the literature: self-monitoring, identity formation, and private selfconsciousness.
Self-monitoring is defined as “self-observation and selfcontrol guided by situational cues to social appropriateness”
(Snyder, 1974, p. 526). It depends on having awareness
of one’s own internal states. Because of this, it is plausible
that self-monitoring would be associated with responding in
a more consistent manner.
From an identity formation perspective, Marcia (2010)
suggests that self-focus has its roots in one’s identity, which
is gained through self-reflection (Erikson, 1963). Individuals
who have a more established, committed identity are better
able to engage in self-reflection when responding to items
about traits and internal states. Presumably, individuals with
a stronger sense of identity would respond more consistently.

Private self-consciousness is defined as a tendency to
attend to one’s inner feelings and thoughts (Fenigstein,
Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Individuals scoring high on private
self-consciousness have better access to their own internal
states. Previous research (McFarland & Sparks, 1985; Hjelle
& Barnard, 1994; Nasby, 1989; Siegrist, 1996) has shown
that private self-consciousness is associated with greater reliability.
Several empirical investigations track the impact of respondent self-focus on scale psychometrics, specifically that
self-focus relates to higher reliability. McFarland and Sparks
(1985) found that private self-consciousness contributed
unique variance in predicting consistency scores. However,
because McFarland and Sparks did not use Cronbach’s alpha,
cautious interpretation is warranted. Results of two other
studies (Hjelle & Bernard, 1994; Nasby, 1989) showed that
retest reliability was higher for participants with high levels
of private self-consciousness compared to low-level respondents. It is noteworthy that since these studies assessed retest
reliability (not internal consistency), their findings are not
directly relevant to the current investigation.
One study (Siegrist, 1996) showed that participants scoring high on private self-consciousness had higher internal
consistency scores on measures of self-representation and
satisfaction (alphas = .924 and .947 respectively) compared
to participants scoring low on private self-consciousness
(.766 and .829, respectively). On a measure of inner speech,
there was a marginally significant difference between participants who scored high on private self-consciousness vs.
those who scored low (.915 vs .840). These results are alone
in showing that greater self-focus is associated with higher
internal consistency reliability as measured by Cronbach’s
alpha.
The present study extends this pursuit to the challenge of
internal consistency estimates among reversal theory measures (Cramer, 2013). It was hypothesized that respondents
who scored high on measures of self-focus should demonstrate significantly higher internal consistency estimates on
the MSP state dominance measures compared to those who
scored low.
Method
Participants
There were 214 male and 408 female members from the
community who agreed to participate. The bulk of the sample (n = 367; 59%) was comprised of students in an introductory psychology class at the University of Windsor in southwestern Ontario, Canada who completed the study for partial
course credit. However, in an effort to both increase sample
size and to diversify the sample, each student had the option of recruiting someone from the community so as to earn
an additional bonus credit. This snowball sampling method
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augmented the sample, obtaining approximately 40% of the
respondents. The sample as a whole had an average age of
24.7 years (SD = 6.1); 84.5% were self-identified as Caucasian, 3.2% Black, 4.5% Asian, 0.3% Native, and 7.4% of
another category; 86.2% indicated that English was their first
language. The student and community groups were not significantly different with respect to these demographic variables, nor with respect to the self-focus or reversal theory
measures.
Measures and Procedure
After providing informed consent, respondents completed
a series of self-report questionnaires in a pencil-paper booklet, consisting (in a random order) of the following measures.
Upon completion, respondents were debriefed as to the procedure and hypotheses.
Motivational style was assessed using the 70-item MSP
(Apter et al., 1998), where responses ranged from 1 = ‘never’
to 6 = ‘always.’ We examined 8 of the 14 subscales: telic,
paratelic, negativism, conformity, autic mastery, autic sympathy, alloic mastery, and alloic sympathy. Whereas many of
these subscales demonstrate adequate internal consistency,
previous research (Ianni & Lafreniere, 2014; Lafreniere,
Menna, & Cramer, 2013; Lafreniere & Cramer, 2006; Sit
& Lindner, 2005) identifies two – the conformity and autic
mastery subscales – with unacceptably low reliabilities.
Self-focus was assessed with three questionnaires (all unitary constructs) designed to measure different facets of the
construct, namely self-monitoring, identity formation, and
private self-consciousness.
Self-monitoring was assessed using the 18-item Lennox
and Wolfe Scale (1984). High scorers are able to monitor
and adjust their behaviour in social situations. Internal consistency estimates from several sources (Cramer & Gruman,
2002; Deeter-Schmelz & Ramsey, 2010) reveal adequate reliability (.75), with a stable and replicable factor structure
(sample item: “In social situations, I have the ability to alter
my behavior if I feel that something else is called for”).
Identity formation, based on Erikson’s model of psychosocial development, was assessed using the 5-point, 19item Identity Formation Scale (Ochse & Plug, 1986; see also
Darling-Fisher & Klein Leady, 1988; Domino & Affonso,
1990). Internal consistency estimates range from .75 to .83,
and correlate with other measures of identity growth (sample
item: “I wonder what sort of person I really am”).
Private self-consciousness was assessed using the 4–point,
7-item Private Self-Consciousness subscale of the Fenigstein
Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Scheier
and Carver (1985) supported the internal consistency (.79)
and retest reliability after 4-weeks (sample item: “I’m always
trying to figure myself out”).

Results
A significance level of .05 was utilized for all statistical
analyses. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, alpha values, and scale intercorrelations) for
all measures. Results showed mild nonnormality among all
variables; however, conversion to standardized ranked variables did not alter the study’s conclusions. A preliminary
analysis of the three self-focus variables by age and gender
show several interesting but inconsistent correlations (p <
.05). For females, age was positively correlated with identity formation, r(339) = .29 but negatively correlated with
self-consciousness, r(326) = -.17. For males, age was negatively correlated with both self-monitoring, r(184) = -.38 and
private self-consciousness, r(192) = -.45.
Table 1 offers a lower-triangle correlation matrix of all
measures. Despite measuring seemingly comparable constructs, the three self-focus measures were only modestly
correlated. This suggests the three measures (while arguably
inter-related) tap relatively unique components of self-focus.
It is particularly noteworthy that some measures of self-focus
correlated significantly with most measures of both the autic
and alloic dominances, as one might predict.
For each of the three measures of self-focus, participants
were divided by median split into low vs. high self-focus
categories. Though some critics (see MacCallum, Zhang,
Preacher, & Rucker, 2002) argue against using this technique, we maintain that the sample is sufficiently large to
suffer little reduction in power via this procedure. So too,
because distinct groups are necessary for this analysis, one
alternative is to divide the sample into thirds, deleting the
middle section of respondents. Despite the loss of sample
size (by approximately 200 respondents), the results (and
conclusions) remained the same. The internal consistency of
each subscale was calculated separately for high self-focus
and low self-focus participants.
Differences in internal consistencies (as measured using
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients) between the high and low
groups were evaluated using Feldt’s (1969) test statistic (see
also Hakstian & Whalen, 1976). Table 2 shows the 1-tailed
comparison test between high and low self-focus participants
by each measure.
Participants scoring higher on self-monitoring had significantly higher internal consistencies (by approximately .04
points) than participants scoring lower for the paratelic, autic
mastery, and alloic mastery MSP subscales.
Participants scoring higher on identity formation had significantly higher internally consistencies (again by approximately .04 points) than participants scoring lower for the
telic, negativism, conformity, and alloic mastery MSP subscales.
Participants scoring higher on private self-consciousness
had significantly higher internal consistencies (by approx-

Note. ∗ = p < .05

Mean
SD
Alpha

Self-Monitoring
Identity Formation
Private Self-Consciousness
Telic
Paratelic
Negativism
Conformity
Autic Mastery
Autic Sympathy
Alloic Mastery
Alloic Sympathy

Scale

45.8
7.61
0.84

1.00
.28*
.01
.21*
.26*
.12*
.14*
.35*
.18*
.20*
.24*

SelfMonitoring

70.1
7.97
0.85

1.00
.06
.31*
.19*
-.05
.05
.16*
.04
.42*
.39*

Identity
Formation

14.7
4.17
0.71

1.00
.16
.01
.14*
-.07
.08
.18*
.02
-.04

Private
SelfConsciousness

16.8
3.60
0.70

1.00
.14*
-.08
.29*
.45*
.14*
.42*
.39*

Telic

14.5
3.50
0.68

1.00
.54*
.05
.30*
.20*
.32*
.18*

Paratelic

Table 1
Correlation Matrix with Means, Standard Deviations, and Alphas for each Scale (n = 622)

7.81
4.43
0.83

1.00
-.08
.29*
.14*
.07
-.11*

15.2
3.11
0.51

1.00
.15*
.50*
.40*
.51*

Negativism Conformity

14.5
3.47
0.61

1.00
.30*
.25*
.14*

Autic
Mastery

15.6
4.25
0.74

1.00
.21*
.30*

Autic
Sympathy

17.1
4.03
0.83

1.00
.62*

Alloic
Mastery

18.7
3.49
0.73

1.00

Alloic
Sympathy
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Table 2
Internal Consistency of Cronbach’s α Values for Participants with High and Low Scores on
Self-Monitoring, Identity Formation, and Private Self-Consciousness, with Sample Sizes and
p-values of differences.

n

Self-Monitoring
Low High
pa
286
336

Identity Formation
Low High
pa
281
341

Private Self-Consciousness
Low High
pa
294
328

Telic
Paratelic
Negativism
Conformity
Autic Mastery
Autic Sympathy
Alloic Mastery
Alloic Sympathy

.68
.65
.82
.50
.53
.73
.75
.71

.64
.66
.81
.47
.59
.76
.77
.69

.68
.69
.79
.46
.50
.71
.81
.70

.68
.71
.83
.49
.62
.76
.88
.72

n.s.
.025
n.s.
n.s.
.015
n.s.
.001
n.s.

.71
.69
.84
.55
.62
.78
.84
.68

.014
n.s.
.032
.037
n.s.
n.s.
.001
n.s.

.73
.70
.84
.54
.67
.78
.85
.75

.033
n.s.
.004
.039
.001
.004
.009
.027

Note. a one-tailed p values using Feldt’s (1969) test statistic for comparing Cronbach’s alphas

imately .07 points) than participants scoring lower for all
MSP subscales except paratelic.
These findings provide support for the underlying assumption of self-focus as a dimension in various reversal orientations.
Discussion
Our results supported the hypothesis that greater selffocus was associated with more consistent responding on
the MSP. Across all three measures, self-focused individuals had significantly higher internal consistency estimates
for most of the MSP subscales. The difference in alpha
coefficients between high and low self-focused individuals
was particularly robust and consistent for the autic mastery
and alloic mastery subscales. There was a significant difference in alpha scores between low and high-self focus for
all three self-focus measures for the alloic mastery subscale.
For four subscales (telic, negativism, conformity, and autic mastery), there was a significant difference in internal
consistency coefficients for two of the three self-focus measures. Although significant, these differences were generally
of relatively small magnitude (approximately .05). However, the magnitude of the difference was particularly high
using the private self-consciousness measure for autic mastery, where the alpha was .17 points higher for those scoring
high on private self-consciousness. It appears that individuals with higher self-focus did not exhibit higher reliability
than low-scoring respondents for the alloic sympathy (with
a difference only noticeable for private self-consciousness)
and paratelic subscales (with a difference only noticeable
for self-monitoring). It is not clear why the private selfconsciousness groups had more and larger differences in reliabilities. Future researchers would do well to delve deeper
into the nomological network and theoretical basis of still
other self-focus constructs.

Our results are similar to those of Siegrist (1996). However, our study is an important addition to the literature as it is
the first to test whether the apparent reliability-enhancing effects of self-focus extend to reversal theory. Another strength
of the present study was the addition of two other measures
of self-focus: self-monitoring and identity formation. Future
research might consider Langer’s (1989; Carson & Langer,
2006) concept of mindfulness as an additional avenue toward
testing the self-focus hypothesis.
Of greatest interest were the conformity and autic mastery subscales, due to their low reliability (Lafreniere &
Cramer, 2006). These findings suggest that self-focus (or
lack thereof) may account for the low internal consistency
reliability of the autic mastery subscale. For the participants
who scored high on private self-consciousness, the autic mastery subscale had an adequate alpha value of .67. Consistent
with reversal theory, individuals “cannot be in the mastery
state unless [they] are regularly experiencing self-awareness”
(Fontana, 1988, p. 353). This suggests that self-awareness is
prerequisite for being in the autic mastery state. Highly selffocused individuals have more self-awareness, so it is plausible that they would be better able to answer the autic mastery
questions in a consistent manner.
In contrast, reliability remained low for the conformity
subscale – even for individuals high in self-focus. Even for
the participants who scored high on identity formation, the
conformity subscale had an alpha value of only .55. Thus,
self-focus does not appear to account for the low reliability
of the conformity subscale. Unlike autic mastery, conformity
is an other-oriented state characterized by the need to obey
rules and meet the demands of others (Apter et al., 1998).
In a conformity state, individuals turn their focus away from
themselves, rendering the benefit of self-focus minimal. This
may explain why self-focus appears to have a relatively small
impact on participant responding to conformity items.

INCREASING THE INTERNAL CONSISTENCY OF THE MSP

It is reasonable to speculate that the low reliability of some
MSP subscales (especially autic mastery) may occur because
they are particularly susceptible to low self-focus. Low levels of self-focus may reduce the reliability of these subscales.
The low reliability of these subscales may be improved by
screening out participants who are low in self-focus.
Our results raise several additional questions. Do respondents higher in self-focus make better research participants?
That is, might we expect – when using these participants –
to see significantly higher correlations between measures,
or more powerful statistical tests with augmented sensitivity. Should researchers prescreen the participants in studies
(particularly reversal theory studies) in hopes of recruiting
those highly self-focused individuals to ensure a greater likelihood of significant results? Are highly self-focused respondents less likely to be yea-sayers? Certainly, more research
is needed to answer these questions.
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